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Greasy Grass 2021

The Reliability of the Physical
Evidence at the Battle of the
Little Big Horn
Can the Physical Evidence Found Provide
an Accurate Picture?
by Albert Winkler

O

ften, artifacts, most importantly bullets and spent shell
casings, found at the location of the
Battle of the Little Big Horn have
been used independently of other
sources to make or refute certain
theories on the encounter. Books
and articles based on these finds
have advanced many arguments on
troop dispositions, types of weapons employed, army movements,
the locations of the fighting, and
the duration and intensity of combat. Yet many of these studies have
not adequately addressed the question of the validity of this physical
evidence. The purpose of the this
article is to summarize earlier arguments on the accuracy of using
bullets and spent shell casings in
research and to present a number
of examples of how the use of these
items in research may be flawed.
Douglas D. Scott, an eminent archaeologist on the battle, has stated
that certain artifacts found on the
battlefield aid in an understanding
of the fight:

Bullets and cartridge cases
were most important in helping us see how the battle was
fought.”1

as undisturbed as possible. Yet the
area has not been preserved, and
therefore the physical evidence is
of questionable reliability.

This assertion is only valid if
these artifacts are unquestionably
reliable. But there are many reasons
to believe that they maybe untrustworthy. This article will show that
the exact opposite. The evidence
presented by the bullets and spent
shell casings is highly questionable and may be of limited use in
helping researchers understand the
battle better.
The relics found on the battlefield
must clearly relate to the encounter,
and the location or context of where
the artifacts were found must be
carefully noted. These items must
also represent a significant percentage of the munitions expended in
the battle, and these artifacts must
be representative of the items that
were removed from the area. Therefore, the battlefield should be considered like a crime scene, and all
the original evidence should remain

Ammunition Expended
On July 11, 1876, only 15 days
after the battle, Major Reno reported on the number of rounds
used by the army, “Amt. Ammunition exp’d. [Amount Ammunition Expended] –– Carbine, 38,030
rounds: [Amt. Ammunition exp’d.]
–– Pistol, 2,954 [rounds].”2 The
total amount of carbine and pistol
ammunition expended was therefore 40,984. Each round once fired
left two artifacts, the bullet and the
spent shell casing. This meant that a
total of 81,968 such objects should
have been on the battlefield from
his command alone, and the Major’s numbers do not include the
ammunition expended by Custer’s
column because Reno had no way
of knowing how many rounds they
fired. The actual total could have
been much higher. However, ar-
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chaeological investigations in the
1980s found only 1,108 spent casings and bullets located at various
areas of the battle.3
Each of the roughly 600 troopers
in Custer’s command carried 100
rounds of carbine and 24 rounds
of pistol ammunition on his person
or in his saddle bags. They were
wielding the Springfield Model
1873 Carbine which was capable of
a high rate of fire, and it could have
left many artifacts very rapidly.
When the U.S. Board of Ordinance
decided on a new standard army
weapon in 1873, they tested its optimal rate of fire, and the Springfield
Carbine had impressive results. A
government report stated that:
A practiced person can fire
this arm from 12 to 13 times per
minute, loading from the cartridge box. It has been fired at
the rate of 23 times per minute
from a cartridge box, by an experienced person.4
These tests were no doubt conducted under optimal conditions,
and actual expenditure in combat
would have clearly been less, but
the weapons could have been fired
rapidly.
The first group of cavalrymen to
combat their adversaries were the
130 men in Maj. Reno’s battalion
which crossed the Little Big Horn
River and engaged in the valley
fight. Lt. George Wallace, Interpreter Frederick Girard, Capt. Myles
Moylan, Lt. Luther Hare, and Sgt.
Ferdinand Culbertson stated that
each soldier shot roughly 30 to 50
rounds of ammunition in the valley
fight. This meant that the 130 men
engaged would have shot between
3,900 and 6,500 rounds of ammunition, leaving between 7,800 and
13,000 bullets and spent casings
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on the field of battle before Reno’s
men retreated to the top of Reno
hill. Unfortunately, very few artifacts have been found in the location of the valley fight.
According to Edgerly, Godfrey,
and Capt. Thomas M. McDougall,
the fighting and the rate of fire on
Reno Hill were very intense at
times, and the troopers expended
much ammunition. Using Reno’s
statement that his command had
fired 40,984 rounds in the entire
battle, and subtracting those used
by his battalion in the valley fight,
then the action on Reno Hill, used
from 34,484 to 37,084 rounds of
ammunition. That left from 68,968
to 74,168 bullets and shell casings
on the field, but modern researchers
found only 305 spent shell casings
and 530 bullets for a total of 835
such objects in the area.5
The amount of ammunition
Custer’s column expended is difficult to assess, but some observations may be made on the intensity and duration of the fight from
the available evidence, including
the din of battle. Many of the men
on Reno Hill heard Custer’s men
when they were engaged in combat. The accounts by Girard, Lt.
Charles Varnum, Hare, Lt. Charles
DeRudio, Pvt. Edward Davern, Lt.
Winfield Edgerly, Packer Benjamin
Churchill, Capt. Thomas McDougall, Scout George Herendeen, Sgt.
Ferdinand Culbertson, and Capt.
Frederick Benteen gave several
estimates on the duration of battle.
Three of them state it lasted from
1 ½ to 2 hours. One said it lasted
one hour, while Benteen testified
the sound lasted from 15 minutes
to a half hour. The majority of the
evidence from the sound of volleys
indicate that Custer’s men fought
for about one and a half hours, and
they could have fired many rounds

in that time. Kill Eagle, Curley, and
Chief Gall said the 210 troopers
with Custer expended much ammunition, while Red Horse and Left
Hand said they did not.
Custer’s battalion brought about
26,000 rounds of carbine and pistol
ammunition to the battle, and I suggest that 25 rounds is a reasonable
estimate of the average number of
cartridges fired by each trooper for
a total of 5,000 rounds discharged.
If that figure of 5,000 was added to
the 40,984 fired by Reno and Benteen’s men, then the cavalry fired
45,984 rounds of ammunition in
all parts of the battle, leaving about
91,968 bullets and shell casings. Yet
far fewer than 91,968 such artifacts
were found in recent excavations,
and some of these objects could be
misleading because the battlefield
could have been contaminated with
items that appear to have been part
of the fight but actually had little or
nothing to do with it.
Godfrey thought that some of the
firing he heard was not directly related to the battle:
We heard two distinct volleys.... I have but little doubt
now that these volleys were fired
by Custer’s orders as signals of
distress [distress in italics in the
original] and to indicate where
he was.6
Some of the artifacts could be
misleading because a number of the
troopers may have fired their weapons at themselves. Wooden Leg
reported that many of the soldiers
in Custer’s battalion “went crazy.
Instead of shooting us, they turned
their guns upon themselves.”7
These soldiers could have panicked
perhaps remembering the warning to save the last bullet for themselves to avoid being captured and
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tortured, but there would be no way
of future researchers to know if a
cavalry bullet was fired at an enemy
or at a friend.
Who fired the Weapons?
Another issue is the question of
who was actually firing the cavalry’s weapons because the warriors
retrieved carbines and pistols from
the men in Reno’s valley fight and
from Custer’s column. On July 24,
1876, Capt. J.S. Poland wrote:
They [the Indians] report,...
that in the three (3) fights they
have had with the whites they
have captured over 400 stand of
arms––carbines and rifles (revolvers not counted).
These three engagements were
likely the Battles of Powder River, the Rosebud, and the Little Big
Horn. Capt. Poland added:
A report from another source
says the Indians obtained from
Custer’s command 592 carbines
and revolvers.8
After the destruction of Custer’s
battalion at the Little Big Horn, the
Indians could have recovered over
200 army carbines and over 200
pistols as well as the remaining
ammunition. As Sgt. Ryan stated,
“The Indians got all their Springfield .45 caliber breech loading
carbines,” and ammunition from
Custer’s men that was used against
the troopers on Reno Hill.9 Varnum
also believed that the Indians used
Custer’s guns against the men on
Reno Hill.9
The best guns in the hands of
the Indians, were the carbines
taken from Custer’s men.10

Wooden Leg reported that:
The Indians took the guns of
these soldiers and used them for
shooting at the soldiers on the
high ridge [Reno Hill].11
Mrs. Spotted Horn Bull reported
that the Indians also got guns from
the soldiers in the valley fight:
The Indians fought the soldiers with bullets taken from the
first party that attacked the village.12
In referring to Custer’s Battalion, Red Horse stated,
It was with the captured
ammunition and arms that we
fought the other body of troops
[on Reno Hill].13
Wallace testified about the difficulty in interpreting cartridge shells
found where Custer and his battalion fought:
You would find them scattered around but whether they
had been used by the men or the
Indians, we could not tell.14
The Indians could have done
some shooting with the captured
cavalry carbines after the battle,
and any resulting artifacts could be
confused with the ones fired by the
soldiers. When Edgerly advanced
to Weir point, he saw Indians shooting bodies of fallen troopers on the
ground.15 Spotted Horn Bull’s wife
stated and Chief Gall affirmed that
many warriors shot troopers that
were wounded, dying, or were already dead.16 The Indians were also
known to shoot ammunition in an
act of triumph. As Edgerly stated,
“It is the custom of Indians to do

a great deal of firing to celebrate a
successful fight.”17
Indians and Soldiers
Remove Shell Casings
Many troopers said there were
numerous shell casings on the battlefield after the fight. Lt. Edward
Maguire, Capt. Moylan, Lt. Godfrey, Sgt. Ryan, and Lt. Wallace
stated that they saw many spent
cartridge shells next to the bodies of
Custer’s men, but the recent excavations have found very few items.
The soldiers might have found
more, but the Indians had already
removed some of the spent cartridge
casings. Lt. DeRudio testified:
I saw [only] a few cartridge
shells [on the battlefield]. I am
informed that the Indians pick
them up.
He was then asked, “Don’t you
know they do it?” DeRudio then
stated, “Yes, sir, I know it.”18
DeRudio also stated his opinion
on Indians picking up shells:
I think their disposition
would be to gather the shells.
They would desire to preserve
the shells to fit the carbines.
When asked if the Indians had
picked “them all up” the lieutenant
replied. “No, sir, they left some.”
Again he was asked, “If they had
time to pick them up at all, had
they not time to make a clean job?”
DeRudio replied, “I think so, but a
few shells can be very easily overlooked.”19
Reportedly, the Indians took the
shells to reload them for future use.
The historian, John S. Gray, believes that:
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The Indians [at the Little
Big Horn] stripped the soldier’s
bodies of clothing, arms, and
ammunition, and as they customarily reloaded empty shell
cases for their own use, they
gathered up many of these,
too.20
John Stands In Timber affirmed
that the Indians took shells. He stated that the Indians often watched
soldiers taking target practice, and
The Indians used to go over
there and pick up a lot of .45-70
lead and reload shells.21
The army also had no interest in
preserving the battlefield, and the
troopers were under orders to pick
up empty shell casings to keep the
Indians from reloading them. General Order 13, issued on February
16, 1876, stated:
Great care will therefore be
exercised by all officers to prevent Indians from procuring the
empty shells thrown away by the
troops after firing, either in action or at target practice.22
George Herendeen indicated that
possibly some soldiers picked up
bullets during the fight at Reno Hill.
They [the Indians] fired at us
from very long range and as the
balls would fall among us we
could pick them up.23
Plundering and Contamination
of the Battlefield
This plundering of the battlefield
was only the onset of a lengthy process of removing artifacts from the location. Tourists came to the area starting in 1877 which began the stream

4

Live Firing at the 1886 Commemoration of the Battle of the
Little Big Horn by David F. Barry
Courtesy of the Little Bighorn Battlefield National Monument

of visitors that continues to this day.
As Don Rickey, Jr. has observed:
Many of the early visitors to
the Custer Battlefield were avid
relic hunters. Thousands of cartridge cases, many relics from the
Indian village site and Battlefield
proper, and even human bones
were taken away as mementoes
of visits to the Battlefield.24

Some tourists even chipped
stones from the Custer Monument
on Last Stand Hill in the mid 1880s
and took them as mementos.25
A significant act of plundering
the battlefield was caught on camera
in 1916. The photo caption reads:
“Gen’l. Godfrey and the late W.M.
Camp searching rocky ridge near Reno’s Hill for cartridge shells, 1916.”
Walter Mason Camp was a tireless
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Gen’l. Godfrey and the Late W.M. Camp Searching Rocky
Ridge Near Reno Hill for Cartridge Cases, 1916.

L.A. Huffman, Miles City, Montana
Brigham Young University Lee Library I., Tom Perry Special Collections, MSS P16

researcher on the Indian Wars of
the Far West. His interview notes,
correspondence, and accounts he
gathered over decades are among
the most important compilations
of sources relating to the Little Big
Horn. Godfrey was a participant in
the battle on Reno Hill who wrote
one of the most important accounts
of the engagement. These men, who
should have known better, were apparently oblivious to the potential
value of such artifacts. No doubt
many others who removed artifacts
also cared little if they destroyed
critical evidence.
Another problem is the contamination of the location by artifacts
that can be confused with those left
during the battle. Soldiers frequently visited the area especially when
Fort Custer nearby was in operation
from 1877 to 1898 and “Picnicking at the Battlefield was a proper
diversion for Army personnel stationed there.”26 Historian, John S.
Du Mont, has commented:
Cavalry exercises were held
on the battlefield once Fort
Custer was established nearby,

in 1877, and live firing was employed. Also hunters and Indians roamed the area for many
years, and this alone would preclude all empty cartridge cases
being of the 1876 variety.27
In 1886, troopers came to the
battlefield to reenact part of the
combat. Some of the men were arrayed in skirmish lines, and they
fired volleys, no doubt leaving bullets and spent casings. The photographer, David F. Barry, took pictures of these men shortly after they
had discharged their weapons.28
Further Problems with the
Physical Evidence
I estimate that upwards of 91,968
bullets and spent shell casings from
the army could have been originally on the battlefield because of the
fight. But the location of only 1,108
or a little more than 1% is known
with certainty, and there is no way
of knowing if some of these objects
supposedly related to the battle
were actually left there as part of
the combat or were introduced later.

I also wonder if such a small percentage is statistically significant.
This small percentage would only
be important if it were a representative sample similar to the data used
by modern political pollsters who
can derive much by a small sample.
To make valid conclusions, modern
pollsters must get their information
from a truly random sample, and
I seriously doubt that the artifacts
found on the battlefield fit that parameter. Rather, the removal of artifacts was done in such a haphazard
manner that the objects which remain could hardly be representative
of what was taken. This means that
a sampling error must be involved.
The reliability of the evidence
presented by the bullets and spent
shell casings is suspect. Only a very
small number of such artifacts have
been found in the area of the valley fight where Major Reno’s men
engaged many hundreds of Indian
warriors. From the accounts of
numerous witnesses, the men in
Reno’s battalion dismounted and
formed a skirmish line. They fought
in that position until they first retreated to the timber along the Little
Big Horn River and later to the top
of Reno Hill. If the only evidence
available was the bullets and spent
shell casings, there would be no
way to demonstrate that any of this
had happened.
The physical evidence on Reno
Hill presents a similar problem. The
bullets and spent shell casings have
been found on the defense perimeter at that position. This is not surprising because in that area is well
known from the testimony of the
participants as well as some of the
rifle pits dug by the men which still
exist. But much of the action at that
position cannot be established by
the physical evidence. Remarkably
few battle-related artifacts have
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been found on sharpshooter ridge
even though numerous accounts
testify that the Indians fired from
that position for hours, and many
soldiers fired back at them. When
men volunteered to retrieve water
from the river on June 26, four men,
who were considered to be good
shots, took position on a little knoll
extending from the army position
on Reno Hill to give them covering fire. Once again, almost nothing
was found at that location, and there
is also little physical evidence to
support the fact that the men went
to the river for water.
In some of the most impressive
military feats in the battle, Maj.
Reno and Capt. Benteen led attacks
on foot to dislodge the warriors
threatening to close on the army
positions. These advances include
Benteen’s Company H driving Indians away from the south end of the
line. Also, three companies charged
in the direction of Sharpshooter
Ridge. If we were to rely solely on
the excavated artifacts, there would
be no way to tell these actions ever
took place.
The question of the reliability
of bullets and spent shell casings
and the deployment of men with
Custer’s battalion must also be addressed. The few scattered artifacts
found in that area are of highly
questionable accuracy and authenticity, and they do little to shed
light on the troopers’ deployment
and the intensity of the fighting.
Arguments which indicate that little fighting took place at Medicine
Tail Coulee, the location of skirmish lines on Calhoun Hill, and
the nature and duration of the fight
on Last Stand Hill are seriously
flawed because they are based on
sparse and unreliable physical evidence only recently retrieved on
the field of battle.
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Any interpretation based on this
lack of physical evidence found on
the battlefield must take into account eyewitness reports of the
battlefield shortly after the fight. Lt.
Edward Maguire came to the site of
the engagement on July 27, 1876.
As the “Chief Engineer Officer,”
he carefully examined the field of
battle and drew a map of the topography and the location of various
actions that took place.
At the Reno Court of Inquiry
in 1879, he testified that he found
much physical evidence to indicate
fighting at various places associated with Custer’s battalion on the
battlefield.
Question: “Were there any evidence of fighting at or near the point
‘B’? [on the map––i.e. Medicine
Tail Coulee], “If so, state what evidence and how near the first was.”
Maguire answered: “There were
empty shells lying all around....”
Apparently referring to Last Stand
Hill, he added:
Every now and then we would
find an empty shell and as we
advanced up further we found
dead bodies in a circle around
the crest of a little hill and quite
a number of empty shells.29
Maguire’s testimony continued
when he was asked the question
“How near to the point ‘B’ was it
that you found empty shells and
evidence of fighting?” The witness
answered:
Upon a little rise, on the
slope, as if persons had lain
there to take advantage of whatever protection there was in the
formation of the ground. There
were government shells and
Winchester shells and one peculiar brass shell was found that

nobody knew anything about
but which was supposed to belong to General Custer’s pistol.30
Clearly much evidence had been
removed from the area, and the fact
that very few bullets and spent shell
casings have recently been found in
no way detracts from the validity of
Maguire’s observations.
Gustave Korn, a trooper who
fought in the battle, examined the
Last Stand Hill after the encounter
and indicated that much firing had
taken place at that location. He stated that the dead officers and men
were found in a circle, and they
had expended all their ammunition,
meaning, no doubt, that many spent
shell casings were found at the location.31
Also, the supposition that there
was no desperate and prolonged
defense at Last Stand Hill because
few bullets and shell casings have
been found there is based on faulty
assumptions. No one knows how
many artifacts were left there at the
time of the battle, and no one knows
how many items were removed
from the location by subsequent
generations of memento searchers.
What few artifacts that have been
found at the site is not sufficient to
support any assumptions about the
fight.
Additionally, other interpretations of the artifacts are also based
on faulty assumptions. When three
spent shell casings shot from the
same cavalry carbine were found on
the field of battle, some researchers jumped to the conclusion that a
trooper fired each of these while he
was retreating. Yet the artifacts do
not indicate if the man was retreating or advancing, or if he retreated
and advanced alternately. The casings also do not indicate when these
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artifacts were left, or even who fired
the weapon. The person wielding
the carbine could have been an Indian, and the gun could have been
fired after the battle.
More reliable information on the
fate of Custer’s men can be found in
other areas. Even though the accuracy of the location of many of the
markers of where the bodies of the
fallen troopers were found has been
questioned, the authenticity of this
information is much more reliable
than that of bullets and spent shell
casings. At least, we know that the
bodies were those of fallen troopers, and we know when they died.
Even if the Indian accounts of the
Custer fight are vague and contradictory at times, they still present
many insights and observations
available nowhere else.
Did the Cavalry Carbines Jam?
Another issue that historians have
tried to resolve by the examination
of spent casings is the question of
reliability of the Springfield 1873
carbine used by the soldiers in the
battle. Many participants stated that
the copper shell casings often became jammed in the carbine, forcing
the troopers to pry them out which
was a situation that caused less combat efficiency at the fight. Yet some
historians have rejected the direct
evidence of the eyewitnesses and
have relied on unreliable physical
evidence to address this issue.
On July 11, 1876, Maj. Reno
wrote to Gen. S.V. Benet complaining about the weapon’s performance
in the engagement:
An Indian scout [probably
Curley], who was with that
portion of the regiment which
Custer took into battle, in relating what he saw of that part

of the battle, says that from his
hiding place he could see the
men sitting down under fire,
and working at their guns–a
story that finds confirmation in
the fact that officers, who afterwards examined the battle-field
as they were burying the dead,
found knives with broken blades
lying near the dead bodies.32
Capt. James W. Reilly was the
Chief Ordinance officer of the Military Division of the Missouri, and
he explained in 1878 why there was
difficulty in extracting spent casings from the carbine in the battle.
He had talked with
one of the most intelligent and
observing officers in the 7th
Cavalry, and who was with Reno’s command at the date of the
Custer Massacre.
The inquisitive captain
learned some facts with reference to the bursting of the cartridge heads from the body in
the carbine.
He stated that the cartridges
had become covered with a
coating of verdigris [deposit of
copper carbonates] and extraneous matter, which had made
it difficult to even put them in
the chamber before the gun had
been discharged at all. Upon
discharge the verdigris and extraneous matter formed a cement which held the sides of the
cartridge in place against the
action of the ejector, resulting
in the separation of the head of
the cartridge from the body and
its ejector alone. To confirm
this theory the officer...had a

number of the verdigris covered
cartridges cleaned...and discharged, and in no instance did
the shell fail to easily extract
entire after explosion.33
By the time of the Reno Court
of Inquiry in 1879, the problems
with the cavalry carbines seemed to
have become common knowledge.
When the interrogator asked Lt. DeRudio:
How many rounds of ammunition could the men fire
from their guns without heating
them? That is, with that rapid
firing?
DeRudio responded:
Not a great many. I noticed
that the men had to take their
knives to extract cartridges after firing 8 or 10 rounds.34
Lt. Godfrey wrote a lengthy account on the Little Big Horn, and
he gave three reasons “Why Custer
was Defeated.”
The first two were the overwhelming numbers of the enemy
and Reno’s panic rout from the
valley.
The third dealt with deficiencies
of the cavalry carbine:
Third. The defective extraction of the empty cartridgeshells from the carbines.
He added:
On the third we can only
judge by our own experience.
When cartridges were dirty and
corroded, the ejectors did not
always extract the empty shells

7

Greasy Grass 2021
from the chambers, and the men
were compelled to use knives to
get them out. When the shells
were clean no great difficulty
was experienced. To what extent this was a favor in causing
the disaster [Custer’s defeat] we
have no means of knowing.35
Trooper Pvt. Charles Windolph,
believed the extractor problems
led to the death of many men and
could have contributed to Custer’s
defeat:
The soldiers, incidentally,
were armed with single-shot 4570 caliber Springfield carbines,
an accurate and deadly weapon
up to 600 yards. But when fired
rapidly the breech became foul
and the greasy cartridges often jammed and could not be
removed by the extractor. This
meant that the empty shell had
to be forced out by the blade of
a hunting knife. This very fact
was responsible for the death
of many a trooper this hot Sunday [June 25, 1876], and may
actually have been the indirect
cause of the great disaster.36
Another trooper, Pvt. William
C. Slaper, praised Capt. Thomas
French’s coolness under fire and
his ability to deal with the cavalry
carbine’s extractor problem in the
battle.
Without appearing to be in
the least excited, he would extract shells from guns in which
cartridges would stick, and pass
them loaded, then fix another,
all the time watching in every
direction.37
Few participants who mentioned
the cavalry carbine saw no prob-
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lems with it. One exception was a
warrior named Lights who talked
about the stand on Custer Hill:

Richard G. Hardorff disagreed
with Horned Horse, and he replied
in a footnote:

The warriors had the guns
and ammunition of the soldiers
at the same time and were better
equipped to fight.
Question: Were there any defects in the guns?
Answer: No.
Question: Did the cartridges
stick in the guns, and when shot
off could the jacket be easily removed?
Answer: The guns were good.38

The facts contradict this
statement. A laboratory analysis of recovered cartridge cases
from Custer’s battlefield indicated extraction failure with
only three of 69 identified carbines. The extraction failure on
Reno Hill was four out of 60
identified carbines. This means
that roughly five of every 100
troopers may have experienced
extraction problems with the
Springfield carbine.40

The experience Lights had with
the cavalry carbine might have been
different from that of the soldiers
because the Indians were using the
weapon in an offensive mode when
they could use the carbines as they
saw fit, and they need not fire them
rapidly. Yet the troopers were badly
outnumbered and could have been
overwhelmed, so they often had to
fire the carbine much more rapidly
to save their lives leading to overheating and extractor problems.
Even though the majority of accounts point to problems with the
carbine, some historians believe that
such testimony has been contradicted by the physical evidence on the
battlefield. This includes the account
by Horned Horse who testified:
As it was, a great number of
Indians fell, the soldiers using
their revolvers at close range
with deadly effect. More Indians died by the pistol than by
the carbine. The latter weapon
was always faulty. It “leaded”
[jammed] easily and the cartridge shells stuck in the breech
the moment it became heated,
owing to some defect in the
ejector.39

Paul L. Hedren also argued that
the physical evidence contradicts
the accounts of the participants in
the battle. Hedren examined hundreds of spent casings that were
found on the battlefield, and he
argued that these artifacts are unquestionably accurate sources. In
referring to collections of artifacts,
Hedren states:
It is deemed fair to say that this
accumulation of shells is a fair
sampling of the cartridge cases
found on the overall battleground
from the standpoint of both Army
and Indian expenditure.41
I must respectfully disagree with
both Hardorff and Hedren. The accuracy of all of these artifacts is
highly questionable, and they certainly do not disprove the theory of
extractor problems in the cavalry
carbine.
Some of the physical evidence
could have been helpful in understanding the engagement in the
years shortly after the battle. At the
fifty-year celebration of the battle
in 1916, two participants in the
conflict, trooper Daniel Newell and
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retired General Edward Godfrey,
disagreed
over the location of one or two
points on Reno Hill and I [Newell] proved my claim by digging
up some empty shells. The general complimented me on my
memory of the affair.42
While two participants in the
battle still saw some value in the
physical evidence, such an analysis
by modern historians is nearly impossible.
I maintain that the evidence presented by the bullets and spent shell
casings found on the battlefield
are unreliable unless supported by
other testimony, and any arguments
based on these artifacts alone are
little more than speculation.
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